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Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard is Followed by Adverse Selection 
 
The outbreak of disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic problem and potential human 
health risk.  Diseases that are highly contagious or have human health implications are often the 
target of government eradication programs.  Farm-level public policies under these programs 
range from bounties for infected livestock to whole herd depopulation and farm 
decontamination.
1     
When livestock is taken by the government for public health or economic reasons, the 
Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution specifies that just compensation must be provided for 
this private property taken for public use.  This compensation takes the form of indemnity 
payments.  The current federal compensation level is defined by the Animal Health Protection 
Act, Subtitle E of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.  This requires that 
compensation shall be based on the fair market value, as determined by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, adjusted for any other compensation received for that event (i.e., disaster payments 
or perhaps even private market insurance).  States may also offer compensation in the form of 
indemnities.  
This paper focuses on the structure of indemnity payments, currently the primary form of 
public compensation, as the key mechanism for providing farm-level incentives to invest in 
biosecurity and to report when one’s herd becomes infected.  These actions have been 
fundamental issues of concern within public agencies responsible for livestock disease outbreak 
response (Ott 2006).  However, it is not clear that existing indemnity programs adequately 
                                                 
1 Off the farm, the United States Department of Agriculture´s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
provides inspection and quarantine services to prevent the introduction of disease across national borders and also 
coordinates response to disease outbreaks from within the country.  Border measures that protect against incursion 
of disease are provided to protect the safety of the American food production system and to prevent infection of the 
domestic livestock industry. 2 
 
address these issues.  Existing indemnity payments represent an implicit insurance policy for 
livestock producers (at least with respect to the diseases for which indemnities are paid), but are 
really more akin to ad hoc disaster payments due to the lack of risk classification and 
underwriting involved.  Indeed, these payments do not have the desirable risk pooling properties 
associated with insurance; there are no premiums based on the risk represented by an insured as 
part of a portfolio of policies, and all taxpayers fund the indemnities.  Accordingly, the current 
structure of indemnities may not generate the desired level of private risk mitigation, thereby 
undermining the government’s livestock disease risk management objectives.   
Prior economic research dealing with livestock disease (e.g., Kuchler and Hamm 2000; 
Mahul and Gohin 1999; Bicknell, Wilen and Howitt 1999; Horan and Wolf 2005; Hennessy 
2007) has also ignored incentive compatibility, at least in the presence of asymmetric 
information.
2  We use a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence 
of information asymmetry between the government and individual farmers.
3  Individuals have 
private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to 
outbreak (ex ante), and following outbreak (ex post) they possess private information about the 
disease status of their herd.  We investigate how indemnities can be developed to ensure 
incentive compatibility between the government and private decision makers, and how these 
incentives influence the occurrence and magnitude of a disease epidemic.  Our focus is on farm-
level biosecurity choices and reporting of disease status. 
                                                 
2 Prior economic research in this area has examined producer response to prices in conjunction with a government 
bounty program for scrapies in the U.S. (Kuchler and Hamm 2000), optimal actions to contain Foot and Mouth 
Disease outbreak in France (Mahul and Gohin 1999), the effect of government programs to eradicate disease on 
prevalence level and private control efforts in New Zealand (Bicknell, Wilen and Howitt 1999), the dynamics of 
optimally controlling infection from a disease which is transmitted between wildlife and livestock (Horan and Wolf 
2005), and behavioral incentives when there is endemic disease in a decentralized setting (Hennessy 2007).   
3 A less formal discussion of these issues may be found in Gramig et al. (2006).   3 
 
We proceed by setting up our model of farmer decision-making in the following two 
sections.  Next, we address the ex post problem of encouraging reporting of disease.  We start 
with the ex post poblem because, regardless of the ex ante actions taken by producers, reporting 
of disease status (as opposed to discovery by another party through transmission, slaughter, or 
testing) is required for timely government response to limit the spread of infectious disease and 
eradicate it.  The length of time between outbreak and discovery is very important in determining 
the cost, duration, and severity of epidemic (UN-FAO).  For these reasons, an incentive structure 
that results in reporting of any infection is of great interest for a social planner.  After solving the 
ex post problem, we investigate the design of ex ante incentives for biosecurity investment 
together with ex post truthful disclosure.  The characteristics of an incentive compatibile 
indemnity rule are derived for the case of a risk averse agent (the farmer) and a risk neutral 
principal (government agency).  We also compare the relative size of first-best indemnities 
(when there is no asymmetric information) and second-best indemnities (where there is 
information asymmetry).  Finally, implications of the model results for public policy and 
indemnity design are considered and conclusions are offered. 
 
A Model of On-Farm Decision Making 
We develop a capital valuation model of the livestock enterprise fashioned after that of Hennessy 
(2007), who adapted the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to the problem of 
livestock disease management.  Our farmer decision model departs from Hennessy (2007) by (i) 
introducing risk aversion on the part of a single farmer (only briefly addressed by Shapiro and 
Stiglitz 1984), (ii) considering biosecurity and disease reporting decisions (whereas Hennessy 
focused exclusively on biosecurity), and (iii) by considering the role of indemnity payments on 4 
 
farmer decisions.  A diagram of the decision-making process described below is provided in 
Figure 1.  The farmer is risk averse with an instantaneous utility function U(ω), where U′>0, 
U″<0.  Wealth, ω, is contingent on the disease state and farmer choices in our model.   
The farmer will be in one of two disease states at any given point in time: susceptible 
(non-infected) or infected, denoted by sub-scripts S and I, respectively.  In the susceptible state 
(θ=0, where θ ∈ [0,1] is a random variable denoting the within-herd disease prevalence rate) 
farmers must choose their biosecurity effort level, b.  Biosecurity reduces the probability of 
transitioning to the infected state, PSI(b), such that  () 0 / ≤ ∂ ∂ b b PSI .  Biosecurity also reduces the 
expected magnitude of a disease outbreak, should one occur.  The conditional probability density 
function of θ is denoted g(θ|b), such that G(θ|b) is the twice continuously differentiable 
conditional cumulative distribution function with ∂G(θ|b)/∂b≥0 ∀ b.  The conditions imposed on 
G mean that G satisfies first-order stochastic dominance in the sense that the cumulative density 
for a given level of infection is non-decreasing (the desirable outcome) in biosecurity.
4   
The farmer has a baseline profit flow when disease-free, gross of any biosecurity 
investment, denoted by π0.  Biosecurity efforts are made at a constant, per unit cost of w.  These 
costs are incurred only in the susceptible state because, once infected, there is no incentive to 
maintain these efforts.
5  The utility of wealth in the susceptible state can therefore be expressed 
as 
(1) ) ( 0 bw U US − = π . 
                                                 
4 Because disease is a “bad”, higher outcomes of the random variable are less desirable and so what we normally 
refer to as the “dominated” distribution is relatively more attractive for our application.  For b0
< b1, G(θ|b1)≥G(θ|b0) 
for all b, where the inequality is strict for at least one value of b. 
5 There may be instances in which biosecurity efforts continue after infection (e.g., to prevent greater infection), but 
modeling this feature unnecessarily complicates the analysis without impacting the qualitative results. 5 
 
In the infected state, the farmer must decide whether to report infection.  Disease 
reporting is modeled as a mixed strategy, denoted r∈[0,1] (where r=1 means always report and 
r=0 means never report).  Reporting results in government testing, verification of infection, and 
culling of infected animals to eradicate the disease.  The farmer is compensated for any culled 
animals with a government transfer denoted by τ(θ).  Culling results in two types of losses for 
the farmer—a loss of asset value λ(θ) (λ′(θ)>0) associated with the livestock itself and 
consequential losses from business interruption χ(θ) (χ′(θ)>0).  Business interruption losses may 
vary widely depending on the characteristics of the individual operation affected and possibly 
disease characteristics.  For instance, the presence or absence of breeding stock or having high 
fixed costs associated with a specific capital asset (e.g., a dairy or egg laying operation) could 
contribute to the magnitude of business interruption losses.  The farmer’s instantaneous utility 
when he/she reports, denoted by the super-script R, is given by  )) ( ) ( ) ( ( 0 θ τ θ χ θ λ π + − − R
I U .   
When a farmer does not report disease, then detection is still possible via government 
disease surveillance activities.  Surveillance activities detect non-reported infection with 
exogenous probability q and fail to detect non-reported infection with probability (1-q).
6  
Detection leads to government culling of infected animals.  Compensation in this case is given 
by τ(θ) – f.  The term τ(θ) is the same as occurs under reporting.  The term f can be viewed as a 
fine for not reporting.  In what follows, we simply refer to τ(θ) as the government transfer and f 
as the fine.   
If the infection goes undetected, the farmer will attempt private culling of infected 
                                                 
6 Government disease surveillance is modeled as being exogenous to reflect the fact that ongoing surveillance 
activities prior to any reporting or discovery of outbreak are conducted based on prior budgetary commitments 
independent of a given disease outbreak.  6 
 
animals.  In this case there is no indemnity payment.  Rather, privately culled animals are sold at 
salvage value σ(θ).  Whether infection is discovered by the government or not, all infected farms 
that do not report incur asset value losses and associated consequential losses due to the cull (as 
occurs under reporting). 
Given this specification, the expected instantaneous utility from not reporting is given by 




I U q f qU .  The overall expected 
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Equations (1) and (2) are individual components of a farm’s inter-temporal decision-making 
process.  In the next section we incorporate state transition probabilities to derive the system of 
equations that represents the full scope of the farmer’s dynamic problem. 
Fundamental Asset Equations 
Define VS to be the expected lifetime utility of the decision maker in the susceptible state.  Using 
the continuous time discount rate ρ, we can define ρVS to be the “time value” of the livestock 
asset when susceptible (Hennessy 2007, p.702).  Similarly, let VI be the expected lifetime utility 
in the infected state.  This notation gives rise to the “fundamental asset equations” (Shapiro and 
Stiglitz 1984, p.436)
7 
                                                 
7 Equations (3) and (4) are derived following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, p.436).  Focusing on VS, we examine 
expected lifetime utility when decisions are made over small intervals of size [0,t]: 
(3a) () [] S SI I SI S S V t b P V tE b P t t b U V ) ( 1 ] [ ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( − + − + = θ ρ .  Note that (1-ρt) ≈ e
-ρt.  Equation (3) is 
obtained by solving (3a) for VS and evaluating it as t→0.  Equation (4) is derived similarly.  An implicit assumption 7 
 
(3)  () () ( ) S I SI S S V V E b P b U V − + = ] [ θ ρ , 
(4)  () ( ) I S IS I I V V r P f r U V − + = ) , ), ( , ( θ θ τ ρ , 
where Eθ is the expectations operator with respect to θ and PIS(r) is the transition probability 
from the infected to the susceptible state.  We assume reporting disease ensures that infected 
farms return to the susceptible state with a transition probability equal to one.  However, private 
culling may not be as effective and only results in transition to the susceptible state with 
probability h<1.  Accordingly,  () [] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( q h q r r r PIS − + − + = .   
The time value of the susceptible livestock asset in (3) equals the sum of the 
instantaneous utility in the susceptible state, US(b), and the expected capital loss if the disease 
state changes from susceptible to infected,  () ( ) S I SI V V E b P − ] [ θ .  Because the post-transition 
level of infection is unknown to farm managers in the susceptible state, the expected capital loss 
associated with this state transition is a function of the expectation of the lifetime stream of 
utility in the infected state. 
Similarly, the time value of the infected livestock asset in (4) equals the sum of the 
expected instantaneous utility in the infected state,  () θ θ τ , ), ( , f r UI , and the expected capital 
gain from transitioning to the susceptible state  () ( ) I S IS V V r P − .  The expectations operator is not 
needed in (4) because the infected farmer is assumed to know the current infection level.   
  Equations (3) and (4) may be solved as a system to yield 
(5)  [] () () () []
() b P
V E b P b U
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in this formulation is that farm businesses are “infinitely lived entities”, as is assumed in Hennessy (2007, p.702) 
and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, p.435).   8 
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Equation (5) shows the lifetime expected utility from being in the susceptible state to be an 
annuity value.  If there was no chance of transitioning to the infected state (i.e., PSI = 0), then 
lifetime utility when susceptible equals the annuity value US /ρ  (i.e., US is received into 
perpetuity).  When there is a chance of becoming infected (i.e., PSI > 0), the annuity value 
changes in two ways:  (i) a risk premium, PSI, is added to the risk-free rate ρ  to yield a risk-
adjusted discount rate that reduces the annuity value associated with the susceptible state to 
US/(ρ+PSI); (ii) we must account for the expected annuity value that accrues in the infected state, 
Eθ[VI]/(ρ+PSI ), weighted by the probability of transitioning to that state.   
Equation (6) illustrates a similar valuation of the expected flow from the capital asset, 
though conditioned on starting in the infected state and accounting for the probability of 
transitioning to the susceptible state.  Note that the term in brackets in equation (6) represents 
VS(b,Eθ[VI]), as derived in equation (5).  If there were no chance of transitioning to the 
susceptible state (i.e., PIS = 0), then lifetime utility equals the annuity value UI /ρ if UI were 
received in perpetuity.  As with equation (5), because there is a chance of returning to the 
susceptible state (i.e., PIS > 0), the discounted stream of benefits takes this into account via the 
risk-adjusted discount rate (ρ+PIS) and the transition probability-weighted annuity value that 
accrues in the susceptible state,  
PISVS(b,Eθ[VI])/(ρ + PIS).  
Expressions (5) and (6) are not in reduced form since they both have expected lifetime 
utility from infection, Eθ[VI], on the right hand side (RHS).  To eliminate Eθ[VI] from the RHS, 9 
 
take the expectation of both sides of (6) with respect to θ, isolate Eθ[VI] and substitute the 
expression back into (5) and (6).  The resulting implicit functions are  
(7)  ()() ( ) ()
() ) ( ) (
] [ ) (
, ,
b P r P
U E b P r P b U
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Note that the expression in square brackets in (8) is equal to (7). 
The general form of these equations is similar to the comparable equations derived in 
Hennessy (2007, p.702-703).  However, the specific formulations are more complicated than in 
Hennessy (2007, p.702).  The level of complexity is greater because (i) his model includes a 
single binary action while we account for two separate continuous choices selected by the 
farmer, and (ii) we focus on the asymmetric information problem and the design of 
indemnification policy which involves business interruption and consequential losses along with 
government disease surveillance, none of which are treated in the earlier work.  
 
The Indemnity Design Problem 
We use the asset value equations to solve the overarching problem of indemnity design that 
achieves public objectives for private biosecurity investment and disease reporting behavior.  In 
practice, we normally think of indemnification in connection with private insurance or 
government-subsidized risk management programs like crop and flood insurance.  Even though 
indemnities are required when takings occur via a government-directed cull, indemnities are also 
intended to serve a public risk management function by providing incentives to report infectious 10 
 
disease and to invest in preventive biosecurity (Ott 2006).  For these reasons, we concern 
ourselves with the design of an indemnification scheme that achieves government risk 
management objectives.  Later, we also discuss whether existing compensation schemes are in 
conflict with stated risk management objectives in the presence of information asymmetry.   
Recall that our proposed payment structure pays one amount, τ(θ), to an infected farmer 
who reports, and a lesser amount, τ(θ) – f (which may be negative), to an infected farmer who 
does not report and is caught.  As we describe in detail below, our proposed indemnity structure 
uses government transfers τ(θ) to address ex ante moral hazard (biosecurity actions) and fines f 
to address ex post adverse selection (disease reporting).  We will begin our analysis with the 
reporting problem, in which a fine is imposed in response to a given reporting strategy, r:  f=0 
when θ=0 or when θ>0 and the farmer’s strategy is r=1; f >0 otherwise when the farmer is 
caught.  This structure, which involves one value of f for each action– reporting or not, given 
θ>0 – is analogous to how adverse selection problems have been addressed in the literature 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).  The fines mimic a “menu of contracts” which induces the agent 
to reveal private information.  We introduce fines because reporting, which yields social benefits, 
is outside the scope of constitutionally-required compensation for takings.  In the next section, 
we propose a method for setting the fine so that it achieves the desired reporting behavior. 
The moral hazard problem is addressed by setting the transfer, τ(θ).  Here the 
government’s transfer to the farmer is based on θ, which is observed (verified as a result of 
testing) after infection is discovered or reported.  The transfer influences the farmer’s incentives 
to take biosecurity actions because the likelihood of becoming infected is influenced by b.  We 
might therefore expect a lower marginal payment for larger infection rates.  This would mimic 11 
 
the risk sharing property of deductibles or co-pays commonly used to address moral hazard 
problems in the principal-agent literature (Laffont and Martimort, 2002), the crop insurance 
literature (Chambers, 1989), and the broader insurance literature (Arrow, 1963; Raviv, 1979).   
In the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard, some combination of the 
instruments used to address both types of information problems individually can be expected to 
induce the desired biosecurity investment and reporting behaviors from the agent in the current 
application.  However, to simplify the exposition, we discuss the different components of the 
indemnity rule (τ(θ) and f ) individually.  We proceed by addressing each of the two parts of the 
information problem in reverse chronological order.  That is, we propose a way to solve for the 
indemnification scheme that will (i) lead the farmer to report any infected animals to the 
government, thereby revealing his/her hidden information, and (ii) create incentives for the 
government’s desired level of biosecurity investment, thereby solving the hidden action problem.   
The Adverse Selection Problem—Reporting  
Reporting is assumed to be socially desirable (all other things equal) because early detection of 
infection limits the duration of a disease outbreak event and has been found to be the most 
important factor in minimizing total economic damages from a livestock disease epidemic (UN-
FAO 2002).  The government’s objective is to set fines in such a way that reporting of suspected 
disease always occurs.  The farmer is the agent in our principal-agent framework and we assume 
he/she chooses a reporting strategy, r∈[0,1], to maximize his/her discounted utility stream in the 
infected state, given by (8).  This means that the marginal incentive to report (positive, negative 
or zero) is given by the sign of  r f r b VI ∂ ∂ / ) , ), ( , , ( θ θ τ , and the associated Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions imply the optimal private reporting strategy.   
The principal wants to set the fine so that the agent always finds reporting to be privately 12 
 
optimal.  The difficulty is that the marginal incentives to report will differ depending on both b 
and θ, each of which are unobservable to the principal.  The principal must therefore set a single 
fine such that the agent finds it optimal to report regardless of the values of b and θ.  
Specifically, the fine is set so that reporting occurs even when the marginal incentives to report 
are at their minimum value.  The minimum value of the marginal incentives to report are given 
by the expression  


























Choosing f such that Λ(f)≥0 for all values of b and θ ensures that the farmer always has a non-
negative marginal incentive to report.  That is, as long as the agent, when operating at the 
margin, is indifferent between increasing and decreasing his/her reporting strategy, then the 
farmer will have a positive incentive to report for any value of θ>0.  This concept is depicted 
graphically in Figure 2.
8  Here b is taken as given and the dashed curve indicates that the farmer 
will not have a positive incentive to report disease for all levels of θ when f=0.  We denote by f 
* 
the fixed fine that achieves Λ(f 
*)=0 and ensures a non-negative marginal incentive to report over 
the range of θ. 
The Moral Hazard Problem—Biosecurity Investment  
Given that f 
* ensures reporting, we now turn to the government’s problem of designing transfer 
payments, τ(θ), that provide incentives for biosecurity investment.  As indicated above in 
relation to deductibles or co-pays used to address moral hazard problems, some amount of risk 
sharing between the government and the farmer will be necessary to solve the hidden action 
                                                 
8 Figure 2 does not reflect the shape of any particular functional form for VI , rather it is provided to shore up the 
intuition associated with the proposed method for setting fines so that reporting occurs.   13 
 
problem.  This can be seen very easily by a quick comparison of the instantaneous utility of 
wealth in the susceptible state and in the infected state (when r = 1) for the special case in which 
the farmer is fully indemnified against all losses:  ) ( ) ( ) ( θ χ θ λ θ τ + = .  In this case, utility when 
infected reduces to  () 0 π U UI = , which is not dependent on biosecurity and is strictly greater 
than utility when susceptible if there is any positive investment in biosecurity  () bw U US − = 0 π .  
In this situation, it is not clear why anyone would biosecure and it suggests that farmers will need 
to bear some share of the risk of disease-related losses for there to be incentive to invest in 
biosecurity.  The question we turn to now is how the government should structure indemnities to 
facilitate risk sharing in a constrained-efficient manner (that is, an indemnity that is second-best 
due to asymmetric information regarding the biosecurity action).  
Assume the government takes into account the private net benefits of livestock 
production, VS(b,1, f 
*), the expected external damages associated with the disease, 









| ) ( θ θ θ β d b g D b , and the expected social cost of government transfers, 









| ) ( θ θ θ τ κ β d b g b .  The function D(θ) (with D′(θ)>0) represents external damages due to 
infection.  The term  () () ( ) ] ) ( ) 1 ( /[ b P P b P b SI IS SI + + = ρ ρ β  (with  0 < ′ β ) is a risk-adjusted 
discount factor accounting for the fact that damages only arise and government transfers are only 
made if the system transitions to the infected state, and that this transition can occur numerous 
times in the future (β is the coefficient on  ] [ I U Eθ  in equation (7) when r = 1).  The coefficient 
κ>0 represents the constant marginal cost of diverting funds to the indemnity program, which 14 
 
may include transactions costs (Alston and Hurd 1990).
9   
Given this specification, the government’s objective function in setting transfers to 
induce biosecurity effort is  
(10) 
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θ τ , 
where the use of fine f 
* drives r to 1, the agent’s unobservable choice of biosecurity effort 
constrains the principal, and “argmax” denotes the set of arguments that maximize the objective 
function that follows.   
Denote  () ( )( ) ) ( / SI IS IS P P P b + + + = ρ ρ ρ α , which is the risk-adjusted discount factor 
associated with the outcome  S U .  Then we can write equation (7), evaluated at r=1 and f 
*, as  
(11)  () ()() () ( )( ) ∫ + =
1
0
* | ), ( , 1 , 1   , θ θ θ θ τ β α d b g U b b b U f b V
R
I S S . 
Equation (11) is the focus of farmer decision making in the susceptible state.  By the revelation 
principle (Myerson 1979; Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin 1979), the constraint in (10) ensures 
the agent’s optimal choice of biosecurity effort b ˆ is constrained to be b, the government’s 
desired level of investment.  The regulator chooses τ(θ) to maximize farmer utility while taking 
into account the cost of indemnities, monitoring, and response to outbreak required to implement 
the chosen disease risk management policy.  The agent’s first-order condition (FOC) with respect 
to b implies the optimal private choice.  We substitute the agent’s FOC for the constraint in 
problem (10) so that it can be written as 
                                                 
9 Because ours is a model of a single agent we do not account for market or social benefits associated with private 
livestock production, but this model could be extended to a multi-agent setting which would realistically consider 
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. 
The approach of substituting the farmer’s FOC in for the constraint is called the first-order 
approach (FOA) (see, e.g., Ross 1973, Harris and Raviv 1979, Holmström 1979, Mirrlees 1999, 
Rogerson 1985, Hyde and Vercammen 1997).  The FOA is valid as a general solution method for 
problem (10) when the convexity of the distribution function condition (CDFC) and the 
monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC) are satisfied (Mirrlees 1999, Rogerson 1985).  We 
assume both of these conditions are satisfied in what follows.  The CDFC is satisfied by 
() 0 / | 2 2 ≥ ∂ ∂ b b G θ .  The conditional probability density function of disease satisfies the MLRC 
if ) | ( / ) | ( b g b gb θ θ  is non-increasing in θ (Milgrom 1981).
10  Whitt (1980) proved that the 
MLRC implies first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD), and is therefore a slightly stronger 
condition than FOSD.   
Because it may be hard to garner intuition from  ) | ( / ) | ( b g b gb θ θ , Milgrom (1981) 
provides an alternative explanation of the relevance of the MLRC in terms of the government’s 
ability to infer the agent’s hidden actions from the observation of θ.  He describes the MLRC in 
terms of a principal who has a prior over the agent’s choice of effort (b), observes the outcome  
realized (θ), and then updates her prior to calculate a posterior on the biosecurity effort choice.  
Denote the posterior probability distribution of b given observed outcome θ by F(b|θ).  Using 
Milgrom’s (1981) results, the nature of disease is such that the MLRC is equivalent to 
() () b b F b F ∀ ≥ ⇒ ≤    | | 0 1 1 0 θ θ θ θ , where θ0 is a more favorable signal than θ1 that the agent 
                                                 
10 Milgrom (1981) finds the term should be non-decreasing in θ, but in his model the action has the opposite effect 
on the distribution as our action b.  Accordingly, the sign is reversed here.   16 
 
exerted the desired level of biosecurity effort.
11  The importance of the assumptions about the 
nature of the MLRC will become clearer when the conditions for divergence from the first-best 
indemnity and the implications of the model for indemnity design are considered below.   
Using the FOA, the Lagrangian for the government’s problem is 
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f b V




* , 1   ,
] ) ( [ ) ( , 1   , μ θ κτ θ β θ L  
where μ is the shadow value of the constraint.  The existence of the constraint, due to the 
farmer’s freedom to make their own biosecurity decision, renders this a second-best problem.  In 
the Appendix we illustrate that μ>0 because the government would like the farmer to increase his 
investment in biosecurity given the optimal indemnity payment.  That is, the optimal indemnity 
here is only second-best due to the information problem; a first-best indemnity could be used to 
attain greater welfare in the absence of information asymmetry (in which case μ would optimally 
vanish).  Holmström (1979) also finds such a result. 
Following Holmström (1979), pointwise optimization with respect to τ(θ) yields the 
following necessary condition, which must hold for all θ 
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Condition (14) implicitly defines τ
SB(θ), the second-best indemnity as a function of θ.  
Specifically, condition (14) can be used to derive 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the interpretation of the MLRC in the current context of a malady is different than the 
examples most often found in the literature because lower realized values of the random variable prevalence 
represent the desirable outcome, whereas in the typical wage contract example higher values of the random variable 





















































π θ χ θ λ θ τ  
where b
SB is the second-best value of b.  This transfer payment compensates the farmer for asset 
and business interruption losses, net of disease-free profits, plus a positive inverse marginal 
utility term that arises due to risk-aversion.  Substituting this expression into  R
I U , we find that 
instantaneous wealth in the infected state equals the final term in (15).  This term ensures the 
farmer’s utility in the infected state depends on the level of infection – that is, the farmer bears 
some risk for his biosecurity choices.  The level of risk borne by the farmer depends on the 
argument of  1 − ′ U . 
  The final term in equation (15) is a diminishing function (due to risk aversion) of its 
argument, which is a ratio of the marginal cost of diverting funds to indemnities to the marginal 
information costs arising from the hidden action.  If the government was not constrained by the 
farmer’s biosecurity choice, then μ=0 and the argument would equal the marginal cost of 
diverting funds to indemnities.  With μ>0, the term  g gb / / + ′ β β  reflects a tradeoff between the 
farmer’s ability to withhold private information and the government’s ability to access this 
information.  By maintaining private information about his/her level of biosecurity effort, the 
farmer is the sole provider of biosecurity protection in its bilateral relationship with the 
government and thus can operate as a monopolist who exerts information power.  Alternatively, 
accessing this private information allows the government to exert monopsony power as the sole 
purchaser of biosecurity efforts (via the incentives provided by the indemnity payment).  
Information is therefore the key to exerting each of these powers, which ultimately determines 18 
 
the amount of risk the government can induce the farmer to bear and the information rents the 
farmer can earn as a result of hidden action. 
Though the government cannot observe b directly, it can make inferences about the 
choice of b by observing the realized value of θ.  These inferences are made based on knowledge 
of the term  g gb / , as indicated above in our discussion of the MLRC, and also the term  β β / ′ .  
Holmström (1979, p.79) points out that the term  g gb /  is simply the derivative of the maximum 
likelihood function ln[g(θ|b)], when b is taken as an unknown variable, and suggests that  g gb / 
measures how strongly one is inclined to infer from θ that the agent did not undertake the 
assumed action.  The larger is  g gb / , the more the government is willing to believe the farmer 
took the required actions and is therefore willing to increase the payment τ
SB(θ).  Essentially, the 
farmer is able to take advantage of his/her information power for larger values of  g gb /.    
Now consider the term  β β / ′ .  This term can be written as  b PSI
SB b , ]) /[ ( / ε ρα β β = ′ , 




SI b PSI b P b b P′ = ε  measures how responsive the transition probability to 
the infected state is to biosecurity efforts.  The larger is  | / | β β′  (since  β β / ′ <0), the less likely 
is a transition to the infected state.  If  | / | β β′  is large and an infection occurs (which the 
government will know about due to reporting), the government can infer that the farmer likely 
did not undertake sufficient biosecurity efforts.  Accordingly, the government reduces τ
SB(θ) 
when  | / | β β′  is known to be large, thereby exerting information power in response to farmer 
reporting.  This means that farmers bear more risk in situations where their biosecurity efforts are 
more likely to prevent infection.  
Finally, the following adjoint equation is also necessary 19 
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Condition (17) determines μ while the constraint in (12) determines b
SB.   
First-best versus second-best 
How do second-best outcomes compare to the first-best outcomes?  The first-best choice of 
biosecurity is the one that the government would choose to make on its own, not having to rely 
on the farmer to make the choice.  Accordingly, the first-best outcome arises when there are no 
constraints on the government’s problem – that is, the regulator is neither constrained by the 
farmer’s first order condition nor is truthful disclosure an issue, so that there is neither an ex post 
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where ) ( * θ τ  is the first-best indemnity schedule.  Condition (18) implicitly defines the first-best 
level of biosecurity, b
*.  This condition indicates that b
* equates the marginal expected private 
costs of biosecurity with the marginal impact of biosecurity on the sum of expected damages and 
indemnity costs.  The first RHS term after the second equality is negative since  0 < ′ β .  The final 
RHS term is also negative since both D and τ
* are increasing in θ (we show τ
*′(θ)>0 in equation 20 
 
(20) below) and since G exhibits FOSD with respect to b.  Accordingly,  ( ) 0 / , 1 , * < ∂ ∂ b f b VS  in 
the first-best outcome.  As  ( ) 0 / , 1 , * = ∂ ∂ b f b VS  in the second-best case (in which the farmer’s 
response to the indemnity matters), condition (18) indicates that b
* > b
SB: the government would 
ideally have the farmer invest more in biosecurity than the farmer would choose for him or 
herself.  The first-best strategy involves requiring farmers to adopt b = b
* (which is verifiable 
with no hidden action) in order to be eligible for an indemnity payment of τ
*(θ) if they become 
infected.  If farmers adopt b<b
*, then no indemnity payment would be made post infection.  
Now consider how the first-best and second-best indemnities compare.  The first-best 
indemnity, ) ( * θ τ , is the special case of (15) in which μ=0 and b is evaluated at b
*.  Assuming 
b
SB ≈ b
*, then we find that the following must hold
12 
(19) 
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Condition (19) indicates that farmers receive information rents, relative to the first-best case, 
under the conditions defined by (19ii), while the government reduces payments below the first-
best level under the conditions defined by (19i).  The relative payment levels in (19) are a result 
of the same tradeoffs that arose in the second-best payment levels defined by (15): they depend 
on the realized value of θ, which the government views as evidence of the farmer’s unobservable 
biosecurity effort.   
                                                 
12 As noted above, b
SB < b
*.  However, we make the assumption, here and in what follows, that b
SB ≈ b
* to simplify 
the presentation.  This does not affect the qualitative results, but would affect the quantitative results (e.g., such as 
the level of θ where τ
SB(θ) = τ
*(θ)).  The sign of (19i) and (19ii) follow from the derivative rule for inverse functions 
and the risk aversion of the farmer.  21 
 
Define the single level of infection at which τ
SB(θ)=τ
*(θ) as θ
*, such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 / | / | * * = ′ + SB SB SB SB
b b b b g b g β β θ θ .  This means that  ) ( * ) ( θ τ θ τ < SB  for  * θ θ > , and 
) ( * ) ( θ τ θ τ > SB  for  * θ θ < .  How small is  * θ ?  It should be small enough to infer that sufficient 
biosecurity efforts have been undertaken.  In particular,  * θ  is smaller than the value of θ, 
denoted θ
~
, at which  ( ) 0
~
= θ b g .  This point in the distribution is of interest because for  θ θ
~
< the 
marginal benefit of biosecurity, in terms of reducing the cumulative density of prevalence, is 
increasing.  A smaller θ yields even larger marginal benefits of biosecurity.  
By structuring indemnities according to (19), the government provides very strong 
incentives for a farmer to undertake significant biosecurity efforts.  If the government observes 
θ θ
~
>  it will pay farmers for culled animals at a lower rate than it would if it could observe 
biosecurity actions directly; this is because a relatively high level of infection suggests a small 
likelihood of private biosecurity effort.  Even for observed levels of infection  θ θ θ
~ * < < , the 
level of effort inferred by the government is still sufficiently low that the farmer cannot extract 
any information rents from the government.  Only if the level of observed infection falls below 
the critical value θ
* will the government be convinced that the agent has invested in biosecurity 
at a high enough level to give up information rents to the farmer. 
The relationship between the prevalence level and size of indemnities is also of great 
interest.  To evaluate the slope of τ
SB(θ), differentiate condition (14) with respect to θ to get 
(20)  () () ()

























































where  ω ∂ ∂ = ′ /
R
I U U  and 
2 2 / ω ∂ ∂ = ′ ′
R
I U U .  The first two RHS terms are positive and equal the 
slope of the first-best indemnity τ
*(θ) (since μ=0 in the first-best case).  The third term arises in 
the second-best case, and the sign of this term depends on the value of θ.  In the third RHS term, 
() ) /( U U ′ ′ − ′ >0 for a risk averse agent, the numerator is negative by the MLRC, and the sign of 
the denominator is determined by the sign of  () () ( ) ( )
SB SB SB SB
b b b b g b g β β θ θ γ / | / | ′ + =  and the 
relative magnitude of terms, which for a given b depends on θ.   
Several different possibilities for the shape of τ
SB(θ) relative to that of τ
*(θ) are depicted 
in Figure 3.  For very low levels of θ, τ
SB(θ)>τ
*(θ).  The second-best indemnity may be initially 
increasing or decreasing based on the sign of equation (20).  This is because γ>0 for low values 
of θ, making the third RHS term in (20) negative and the sign of  ) (θ τ′  ambiguous.  The negative 
third term means the slope of τ
SB(θ) is initially less than the slope of τ
*(θ), so that these curves 
eventually intersect and become equal at  * θ .  When θ> * θ , then γ<0 and the denominator of the 
third RHS term is of ambiguous sign.  Denote θ ˆ (with θ ˆ> * θ ) to be the value of θ such that the 
denominator of the third RHS term vanishes; the slope of the second-best indemnity goes to -∞ 
and there is a discontinuity in the graph of τ
SB(θ).  This means the slope of τ
SB(θ) becomes 
negative prior to θ ˆ.  If  1 ˆ < θ , this suggests that for any observed prevalence  θ θ θ ˆ * < < , the 
second-best indemnity should be paid at a level below the first-best level to maintain the 
appropriate incentives to invest in b.
13  
                                                 
13 It should be noted that for  θ θ ˆ >  the slope of the second-best indemnity is expected to be +∞ as you approach θ ˆ 
from the right.  This suggests that it is possible that the first- and second-best indemnities cross again at another 
point  θ θ ˆ > , but it does not seem likely that an information reward would be optimal at high levels of θ.  Moreover, 
whether or not θ ˆ falls within the unit interval is unknown. 23 
 
While it is mathematically possible for the slope of the second best indemnity function to 
be positive and/or negative over the range of θ, an indemnity schedule that is monotonically 
decreasing in the prevalence level, such as  () θ τ SB
1 , would provide the strongest incentives for 
biosecurity.
 14  In such cases the information rents paid to the farmer would be strictly decreasing 
with prevalence up until  * θ θ = .  Beyond this point, the reduction in payments relative to the 
first-best case would be increasing.  Biosecurity incentives would seem to be weaker under the 
curves labeled  SB SB
3 2   and   τ τ , which seem contrary to the government’s objective.  
The extent to which observed prevalence is a good signal of actual preventive bio-
security effort is clearly important for implementing the indemnity schedule, τ
SB(θ).  It is 
conceivable that for diseases that are extremely contagious (i.e., Foot and Mouth Disease, Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Exotic Newcastle’s Disease, or Classical Swine Fever) an 
individual’s herd could become infected regardless of the extent of biosecurity measures taken ex 
ante.  For this reason, a “one size fits all” policy that only pays indemnities on the basis of 
observed prevalence levels is likely to be problematic in practice. 
This does not preclude a disease-specific indemnification rule which would pay farmers 
τ
SB(θ) for all but the most infectious diseases and pay them according to τ
*(θ) during outbreaks 
of highly contagious diseases (where observed prevalence is not a good signal of effort).  
Indemnifying farmers in this disease-specific manner does not diminish reporting incentives 
                                                 
14 For  θ θ ˆ < , the condition required for a monotonically decreasing second-best indemnity schedule like  () θ τ
SB
1  in 
Figure 3 is   ( )( ) () () () ( ) μγ θ θ θ μ θ χ θ λ + ∂ ∂ ′ ′ − ′ < ′ + ′ 1 / ] / | / | [ )] /( [ b g b g U U b .  This condition may be reasonable 
in practice because  () () θ χ θ λ ′ + ′  is likely a very small positive quantity at lower values of θ.  Alternatively, the 
condition that gives rise to the increasing segments of  SB SB
3 2   and   τ τ  over the relevant range of θ is 
() () ( ) ( ) () ( ) μγ θ θ θ μ θ χ θ λ + ∂ ∂ ′ ′ − ′ > ′ + ′ 1 / ] / | / | [ )] /( [ b g b g U U b  for that range of θ. 24 
 
because of the use of f 
*; also, if low prevalence levels are verified when responding to an 
outbreak involving such pernicious diseases, this could be treated as an even stronger signal that 
the farmer made a significant investment in biosecurity and such behavior should be rewarded by 
paying τ
SB(θ)>τ
*(θ).  The World Organization for Animal Health (Office International des 
Épizooties or OIE) maintains a list of diseases that must be reported to the international 
community.  The OIE’s list of reportable diseases (formerly called “List A” diseases) could serve 
to determine which diseases should be associated with such a disease-specific indemnification 
rule—that is, diseases on the list are compensated on the basis of τ
*(θ) (with information rents if 
low prevalence is verified) and all other disease losses are indemnified according to τ
SB(θ).  An 
indemnification rule similar to that implemented in Belgium and the Netherlands seems to match 
the suggested indemnity from our model (Horst et al. 1999).  This indemnification rule is briefly 
discussed below.  
 
Policy Implications 
Our model uses two distinct mechanisms to provide incentives for biosecurity and truthful 
disclosure: (i) indemnities to achieve desired levels of biosecurity, and (ii) fines that induce 
disclosure of disease status (alternatively, these mechanisms can be viewed as a differential 
indemnity schedule based on whether an infected farmer reports or not).  By using two distinct 
policy instruments, individually designed with each information problem in mind, it is possible 
to create clear incentives for farmers to behave in a manner that is consistent with government 
risk management objectives.   
Status quo indemnification for livestock disease losses by USDA has paid producers on 
the basis of “compensation value” equal to “fair market value assuming disease-free status” (Ott 25 
 
2006, p.72).  This amount is necessarily greater than the true market value of diseased animals 
culled by the government and is intended to create incentives for reporting.  The government has 
also recognized that unless farmers face some uncompensated losses as a result of outbreak they 
cannot be expected to take preventive biosecurity measures and thus does not compensate 
farmers for consequential losses when issuing indemnities.  Animal health authorities have relied 
on a single mechanism—indemnities—to facilitate both ex ante biosecurity effort and ex post 
reporting.   By using a single mechanism to induce biosecurity and reporting simultaneously, the 
incentives for each individual private action are not clear.  
Direct comparison of the relative magnitude of status quo indemnities and the second-
best indemnities implied by our analysis is not possible, but the major difference is the shape of 
the indemnity schedules implied by the different policies.  Status quo policy suggests the 
indemnity schedule is strictly increasing in θ (just like the first-best indemnity, τ
*(θ), depicted in 
Figure 3), while the second-best indemnity implied by condition (19) is declining over at least 
some segment of the range of θ .  It is not at all clear how the incentives created by the status quo 
policy facilitate the government’s joint objectives.  An upward sloping indemnity schedule, in 
the absence of any penalty for not reporting, may actually create incentives for infection when 
you consider that the status quo has sought to use indemnities based on the disease-free fair 
market value of livestock as a means of resolving the ex post adverse selection problem.   
In an effort to induce early reporting, Belgium and the Netherlands no longer compensate 
producers for dead animals and only partially compensate them for diseased stock (Horst et al. 
1999).  This approach, arrived at as a result of these countries’ experiences with Classical Swine 
Fever and Foot and Mouth disease, shares some important elements with our second-best 
indemnities.  First, while there is not an explicit fine for not reporting, there is a penalty to 26 
 
waiting to report since dead animals fetch no payment.  This feature can help to achieve 
incentive compatibility with reduced or eliminated monitoring costs.  Second, partial 
compensation for already-infected animals shifts some of the risk to farmers, as do our payments.  
An indemnity plan that does not shift risk in this fashion may actually create incentives for 
infection, which could be one problem associated with status quo U.S. policy.  
  The discussion of incentive compatibility applies not only to public policy but also to the 
development of private insurance for livestock disease protection.  If private coverage is 
available to farmers, the incentives provided by livestock insurance contracts could potentially 
be in competition with the objectives of policy while satisfying the individual objectives of 
producers (i.e., income smoothing as risk management).  Careful consideration in the design of 
private market coverage for livestock disease losses is required in order to ensure that public 
policy and private risk management products are jointly incentive compatible.  Also, design of 
public policy should take into account the role that private coverage could play in achieving 
public policy objectives and how government decisions may hinder or bolster private markets for 











where c is a constant.  c=0 for the farmer’s problem, while we indicated in condition (18) that 
c=c*<0 for the first-best outcome.  Using this notation, the Lagrangian is   27 
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: an increase in c when c=0 means 
the solution moves farther away from the first-best outcome of c*<0, implying a reduction in 
welfare.  Hence, μ>0. 
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Figure 3.  Possible shapes for the first-best indemnity payment schedule, τ
*(θ), and the second-
best indemnity payment schedule, τ
SB(θ).   